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 To start off the essay, the author shows how philosophical accounts of both music and 
sound fail to distinguish the two from each other.  Disproving the idea that sounds are purely 
mental, the author proceeds to shows that music and sound have no metaphysical difference.  
Using three different realist accounts of sound and music, (Properties, waves and events) the 
author effectively shows that these views fail to distinguish one from the other.  The author 
claims that the difference in music and sound is not the constitutive properties of the sound 
waves, but rather how it is interpreted by the listener.  Elaborating on the nature of how one 
listens to music, the author states that listening to music cannot be a passive experience.  Rather 
in order to listen to music, one must be actively understanding the patterns of the music.  The 
author then tackles the argument that listening to music requires concepts in order to truly 
understand it.  Concluding the essay, the author states that any sound can be listened to as music.  
However, the author distinguishes listening to sound as music, to what is defined as a musical 
work. 
 I want to start with the idea of concepts and how they are not/ are related to music.  In the 
section concerning concepts, the author is insistent that concepts are not a part of how we listen 
to music.  However, in the same section, the author claims that “Recognition, then, does not have 
to involve concepts.”  This statement seems to be false.  If I am to recognize something for what 
it is, I must already have a concept of what that thing is.  Simply put, I cannot recognize 
something that I know nothing about.  The majority of page 16 does not convince me in the 
slightest.  “Having the concept ‘fugue’ or even ‘fugal subject’ does not help me hear a particular 
fugal subject” (16).  The above quote from page 16 seems to be contradictory to statements made 
about what distinguishes music from sound.  “I shall try to show that listening, as an active 
conception of all human interaction with music, including that of the musician and the 
composer, provides the ontological backbone for accounts of music across all cultures and 
circumstances”.  The author appears to state that listening to music is not based on concepts but 
also states that listening is an active conception of all human interaction with music.  This is a 
blatant contradiction that takes away from the strength of the argument.  However, I do believe 
that the authors ultimate view of music can be reconciled with the idea that concepts are 
necessary to listen and understand music.  The conclusion of the essay states that “Music is 
distinguished from sound because of the way we listen to it” (23).  This statement seems to be 
compatible with a conceptual account of understanding music.  The author states that their idea 
of listening to music “avoid(s) the standard problems with accounts of music which rely on 
metaphysical assumptions and conceptual apparatuses” (23).  The standard problems with 
accounts of music based on conceptual apparatuses is not clear to the reader and therefore the 
omission of conceptual apparatuses does not follow. 
 Aside from the conceptual omission, the majority of this essay is very well thought out 
and written in a way that the reader can follow the steps.  Although a slight knowledge of basic 
western musical theory is very useful, it is not necessary.  As for the presentation of this 
argument to an audience at the conference, it may be helpful to clearly distinguish the sections 
(ie, Music vs. Sound, Listening to Sound vs. Listening to Music, and what defines Musical 
Listening.)  Clearly distinguishing these sections may help the audience not get lost in the 
distinction (or lack thereof) between Music and Sound.  It may also be helpful to briefly not what 
the “standard problems with accounts of music which rely on metaphysical assumptions and 
conceptual apparatuses” refers to.  
